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Agentic AI attack

Comet browser users agentic AI attack — Jun 2026

Security researchers demonstrated that the Comet browser's AI agent could be hijacked via malicious content to autonomously extract sensitive user data

Reported date
Jun 16, 2026
Target
Comet browser users
Agent type
Web / browser agent
Agent role
Compromised agent

The exact incident date was not established. This entry is dated by its source report.

Updated Sep 25, 2026 · 1 min read

What happened

Security researchers have identified significant vulnerabilities in the Comet browser, a Chromium-based agentic browser developed by Perplexity. The browser's AI agent, designed to perform multi-step tasks across web sessions, has been shown to be susceptible to indirect prompt injection. This attack technique allows malicious actors to embed hostile instructions within web content—such as Reddit spoiler tags, calendar invitations, or other documents—that the agent processes as legitimate commands.

In August 2025, security researchers at Brave demonstrated this vulnerability by placing invisible instructions inside a Reddit spoiler tag. The Comet agent read the tag, followed the hidden commands, and successfully extracted a user's email address and one-time passcode. Further research by Zenity Labs in March 2026, part of a vulnerability family dubbed "PleaseFix," revealed zero-click hijacking paths in Comet. These researchers demonstrated that the agent could be manipulated to access and extract credentials from a 1Password vault through the agent's authorized workflows, without requiring a direct exploit of the password manager itself.

These incidents highlight a fundamental security challenge in agentic browsers: the design requires the agent to operate with full user-level authenticated access to every domain the user has logged into. Because the language model cannot reliably distinguish between user-intended commands and attacker-injected instructions, the agent can be coerced into performing unauthorized actions. Security researcher Stav Cohen described this mechanism as "intent collision," where the agent merges legitimate user instructions with attacker-controlled content into a single, compromised execution plan. While Perplexity issued fixes for the Zenity Labs findings in February 2026 and worked with Brave to address the earlier disclosure, the underlying architectural risk remains a subject of ongoing concern for security professionals.

Evidence in the reporting

Incident evidence
Comet read the tag, followed the hidden instructions, and extracted
Agent involvement
the agent read content the attacker has touched

Sources